An Internal Fuel Efficiency Credit Market Mechanism for Meeting the CAFE Standard: Internalizing a Regulation Caused Externality by Plott, Charles R. & Katz, Gabriel
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
AN INTERNAL FUEL EFFICIENCY CREDIT MARKET MECHANISM FOR
MEETING THE CAFE STANDARD: INTERNALIZING A REGULATION
CAUSED EXTERNALITY
Charles R. Plott
Gabriel Katz
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1297
September 2008
1  
ABSTRACT 
 
An Internal Fuel Efficiency Credit Market Mechanism 
for Meeting the CAFE Standard: Internalizing a Regulation Caused Externality  
Charles R. Plott 
Gabriel Katz 
California Institute of Technology 
 
The paper develops and analyzes an internal market based mechanism that enables a decentralized 
enterprise to meet the conditions of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations.   
Divisions that produce vehicles with fuel economy (miles per gallon fuel) above the regulatory 
requirement receive Fuel Efficiency Credits (FEC). These credits can be sold in an internal FEC 
market to divisions that produce vehicles with fuel economy levels below the regulatory 
requirement.  The FEC available for sale by fuel efficient vehicle production and the FEC needed as 
a condition of production of fuel inefficient vehicles are tied to the respective fuel efficiency levels.  
Experimental tests demonstrate that the enterprise can achieve near profit maximum levels while 
continuing to operate through decentralized profit centers.  The FEC market “internalizes” the 
externality across divisions created by the CAFE regulation. The behavioral model supported by the 
data suggests that the policy can be successfully crafted to include multiple firms trading FECs. 
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 This paper develops and explores a mechanism for a decentralized vehicle producer to meet 
the challenges that are created by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation. The 
regulation requires that the average fuel economy across all vehicles produced by the enterprise be 
at least as great as a regulatory minimum.  By linking the production levels of decentralized 
divisions, the regulation creates an externality between otherwise independent profit centers 
specialized for the production and sale of different types of vehicles.  That is, previously 
independent divisions become connected by a new company-wide system constraint that the 
average fuel economy exceeds some constant. The mechanism studied here rests on an internal 
market for Fuel Efficiency Credits (FEC). The analysis is based on a laboratory experimental 
testbed methodology. The issue addressed is whether a special market architecture in which 
decisions are made by decentralized divisions subject to a system-wide CAFE standard regulatory 
constraint is profit-maximizing from an integrated company point of view. Can the mechanism 
enable a vehicle manufacturer to meet the CAFE standards most profitably while operating as a 
decentralized organization?   
 Our results indicate that high aggregate efficiency levels can be achieved through this 
market institution. The manufacturer’s performance, as measured by vehicle production, profits, and 
fuel-efficiency, can be substantially enhanced over a benchmark process of scaling back to the 
CAFE standard from the unconstrained output levels. The theoretical framework and the 
experimental methods used in the paper can be modified and adapted to account for additional 
complexities, such as allowing for fuel efficiency credit trading between firms. 
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1. Introduction1 
The Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency standard (CAFE) for passenger cars and light duty 
trucks was enacted by Congress in 1975 with the aim of improving vehicle fuel efficiency in a 
period of high oil prices. In short, the CAFE regulation requires each car manufacturer to meet a 
standard for the sales-weighted fuel economy for the entire fleet of vehicles sold in the USA in each 
model year; fuel economy, measured in miles per gallon (mpg), is defined as the average mileage 
traveled by a vehicle per gallon of gasoline or equivalent amount of other fuel.2 While the original 
goal of the program was for every seller of automobiles in the US to achieve a minimum sales-
weighted average fuel efficiency of 27.5 Miles per Gallon by 1985, a bill increasing the standard to 
35 MPG by 2020 recently passed. 
Although previous research has analyzed the environmental effects of the CAFE regulation 
and its aggregate impact on vehicle production and fuel prices (Mayo and Mathis, 1988; Greene, 
1990; Goldberg, 1998), few studies have examined its implications from the perspective of the 
organization of a profit-maximizing vehicle manufacturer. The focus of this paper is to analyze 
methods that might be used to enable a vehicle manufacturer to meet the CAFE standards most 
profitably while operating as a decentralized decision-making entity. The manufacturing firm is 
assumed to be a decentralized organization with independent divisions motivated by maximizing 
division profits and subject to a system-wide CAFE standard regulation. The divisions control the 
number of vehicles produced, and the efficiency characteristics of those vehicles, which, in turn 
determine vehicle cost and market demand.  For the purposes of the exercise studied here, both 
vehicle cost and market demand are known for given vehicle characteristics and production levels. 
Several relevant questions regarding the operation of such a decentralized decision-making 
process consistent with the CAFE standard regulation arise. These questions motivate the research.  
Do the decisions of decentralized profit centers lead to profit-maximizing outcomes from an 
integrated company point of view? What are the effects of this market institution on the firm’s total 
production and its composition? What are the effects of the CAFE standard in terms of the 
manufacturer’s overall fuel efficiency? 
                                                 
1 The research support of Ford Motor Company and the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.  
Technical support was supplied by the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science.  The 
authors express their thanks to Suzhou Huang and David P. Chock of Ford Motor Company for their help and 
suggestions.   
2 A detailed discussion of the CAFE standard regulation exceeds the purposes of this paper. An excellent overview can 
be found in Crandall (1985, 1990). 
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In order to address these questions, we use an experimental strategy to analyze the 
functioning of an internal market for Fuel Efficiency Credits (FEC) in which organized trading and 
FCE pricing between the different divisions of the manufacturing firm occurs. Divisions producing 
fuel efficient vehicles produce FEC as a joint product with vehicle production; the FEC produced 
can be sold at the prices that emerge from the internal FEC market, and revenues from FEC sales 
contribute to the FEC producing division profits. In contrast, divisions producing fuel inefficient 
vehicles must acquire FEC with each vehicle produced; the FEC are purchased from those divisions 
that produce FEC, and the prices paid are determined by the internal competitive market. The cost 
of FEC is a cost of production to the division that must purchase them and thus reduces division 
profits.  The objective is to create a process that leads independent divisions within the vehicle-
manufacturer to the same profit maximizing position for the firm as a collective, as would be the 
case if an “all knowing” centralized decision-maker made all decisions for all divisions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theory 
underlying the operation of an internal Fuel Efficiency Credit (FEC) market mechanism for meeting 
the CAFE standard. Section 3 presents the experimental procedures and design implemented to 
examine the performance of this market institution and its implications in terms of the 
manufacturing firm’s production, profits, and total fuel economy. Section 4 discusses the main 
empirical results of the experiments from two perspectives.  The first is a type of proof of principle. 
Does the system do what it is supposed to do?  The second is a check on the internal consistency of 
the design.  Does it do it consistently with the principles at the foundations of the design?   Section 
5 concludes, and Appendices I and II contain information about the computer software and the 
instructions used in the experimental sessions. 
 
2. The Mechanism Architecture 
We analyze a market exchange process in which “fuel economy” permits (FEC) are traded 
between different divisions of a vehicle-manufacturing firm in an open market at a price P . Let 
,i rM be the number of FEC held by division i , 1,...,i n= , which produces vehicle type r , 
1,..., ,r R=  with a miles per gallon performance (mpg) equal to rα . The CAFE standard regulation 
requires that the average miles per gallon (mpg) value of the cars sold by the manufacturer must not 
be above a certain value K.  In the context of the mechanism (the market exchange process) under 
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analysis, assume that, as a form of internal regulation, for all divisions i , types of vehicle r , and 
production ,i rq , it must be the case that: 
            
       ( ), ,i r r i rM K qα≥ −                                                      (1). 
Thus: 
 if   r Kα >  , division i  can create and sell permits in the internal FEC market up to the 
magnitude for which (1) is satisfied – where the constraint allows negative holding;  
 if r Kα < , division i  must buy FEC to produce vehicles. 
 
Note that, given the constraint that the net supply of permits among the manufacturer’s 
divisions must be zero. Thus, the system must satisfy the equation:  
                                                                      , 0i r
i r
M =∑∑  .                                                           (2),  
Substituting in (1) and assuming equality yields: 
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0
r i r
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i r r i r
i r i r
K q
K q q
α
α
− =
− =
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∑∑ ∑∑
                                    
which satisfies the CAFE regulation standard that  
                                                                  
,
,
r i r
i r
i r
i r
q
K
q
α
≥
∑∑
∑∑                                                               (3). 
Thus, the constraints enforced by the mechanism guarantee that the CAFE regulation is 
satisfied as a technical guarantee. Notice that this is done in the absence of an overall, centralized 
accounting and balancing of production levels. 
 
3. Mechanism Theoretical Behavior 
The analysis is contained in three sections. First the equilibrium behavior is analyzed for the 
case in which the fuel efficiency levels of all types of vehicles are fixed.  Thus, the problem with 
which the system is confronted is to determine the optimal level of production for each vehicle.  
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The second section analyzes the case in which each division produces only one type of vehicle but 
the fuel efficiency level of that vehicle can be adjusted within the technical and cost parameters. 
Finally, the third section generalizes the theoretical model to the case of multiple firms. Although 
the experimental methodology implemented in this paper is explicitly aimed at examining the 
performance of a single firm the mechanism itself can be generalized to multiple firms. That is, the 
internal Fuel Efficiency Credit (FEC) market mechanism for meeting the CAFE standard in a single 
firm can be extended to multiple firms who trade FEC each operating with its own CAFE standard.   
Section 3.3 illustrates the property.  
 
3.1 Fixed Fuel Efficiency Levels  
  Our attention now turns to models of behavior.   In this setting, and assuming that all divisions 
have an initial endowment of 0 FEC, division i ’s profit maximization problem is then given by:  
 
                    ( )
,
, , ,max   
i r
i r i r i rq
V q P M−                                                          (4), 
 
where ,i rV  is the profitability of vehicle of type r  produced by division i , and P , ,i rM  and ,i rq  are 
defined above. Under competitive conditions, profit maximization takes place when 
  
                                                                ( ),
,
0i r r
i r
V
P K
q
α∂ − − =∂                                                         (5) 
which implies                                                     
           ( )
,
,
i r
i r
r
V
q
P
K α
∂
∂ =−                                                            (6). 
 
The behavioral equations 5 and 6, together with the system balancing equation (1) and (2) 
define equilibrium for the firm.  It follows from (6) that the value of the marginal output is negative 
at the optimum for those vehicle producers with mpg over K . This means that they are producing 
vehicles beyond what would be profitable under no CAFE constraint. The incentive to do so is 
created by the profits due to FEC sales to other divisions.  
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The equilibrium of the system is the profit maximizing optimum of the firm subject to the 
CAFE constraint given the fuel efficiencies of the individual vehicles produced. If the technology is 
fixed in the sense that the efficiency levels of the vehicles produced by the different divisions are 
fixed, then the levels of production will be coordinated to achieve a system profit maximum.  That 
is, for a fixed efficiency levels of individual vehicles the equilibrium of the decentralized market 
exchange process determined by (5)-(6) satisfies the optimal conditions of the solution to the 
vehicle-manufacturer’s centralized profit maximization problem:   
 
( ), ,
,
max
subject to: 
: ,
: ,
i r i r
i r
r r i r
i
g r r r
r r
V q
Q q
Q K Q
λ
λ α
−
−
∑∑
∑
∑ ∑
                                                    
 
where rQ  is the total production of vehicles of type r by all divisions. The Lagrange multipliers rλ , 
1,..., ,r R= , are the marginal value of producing an additional car of type r. The multiplier gλ , on 
the other hand, is a measure of the implicit marginal system benefit of increasing the CAFE 
regulation standard K; actually, it is the marginal system benefit of increasing ,z  where 
r r r
r r
z Q K Qα= −∑ ∑ .  
The Lagrangian problem – assuming K  and z  constant -  is thus:  
 
            ( )
,
,
, , ,, 1,..., ; 1,...,
, 1,...,
max
i r
r r
g
i r i r r r i r g r r rq i n r R i r r i r r
Q r R
H V q Q q Q K Q z
λ
λ
λ λ α
= =
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑           (7) 
with first order conditions – assuming that the constraints are satisfied – given by:  
 
                                                                         ,
,
i r
r
i r
V
q
λ∂ =∂                                                                   (8) 
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                                                                 ( ) 0r g r Kλ λ α+ − =                                                           (9) 
so that 
                                                               ( )
,
,
i r
i r
g
r
V
q
K
λ α
∂
∂= −                                                                   (10). 
 
    It follows from (5)-(6) and (8)-(10) that the equilibrium of the decentralized market 
exchange process satisfies the conditions of the centralized (mathematical) optimum; in addition, 
the CAFE regulation standard is also satisfied, with the marginal cost of the CAFE constraint 
properly identified in gP λ= .  
 
3.2 Variable Fuel Efficiency Levels 
The model has even more powerful predictions that include the case in which divisions can 
change the efficiency levels of their vehicles in response to market incentives. That is, if the 
different divisions can change the miles per gallon (mpg) fuel efficiency of the vehicles they 
produce, an additional equation becomes important to describe their behavior.  The mpg parameter 
becomes part of the valuation function for vehicles of type r , since it influences both demand and 
cost. Hence, an additional equation is added to the First-Order Optimization Condition for vehicle 
producers:  
, , i r i r
r r
V M
Pα α
∂ ∂=∂ ∂                              (11). 
 
Equation (11) implies that the value of the marginal change of mpg is balanced against the 
change of revenue from FEC sales or change of cost of FEC purchases that will result from the 
technological change. Therefore, if division i  sees a profit that would result from a mpg change, it 
will make the change as guided by the price of FEC. 
Thus, the behavioral model of decentralized division choices become profit maximizing for 
the firm operating under CAFE constraints.  Theoretically, this takes place without centralized 
decision making other than the creation and enforcement of the rules of the process.  The 
technologies and market conditions faced by the individual divisions need not be known by the 
centralized administration of the firm.  Yet, each division acting in its own interest leads to the 
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optimum fuel efficiency of individual vehicles and the optimum production of each from the 
centralized firm point of view. 
3.3 Generalization to multiple firms within an industry 
The theoretical model and behavioral mechanism can be easily extended in order to capture 
the efficiency advantages of coordination across multiple firms in an industry, each operating with 
its own CAFE standard, with FEC traded between firms.  While only trading of FEC takes place, it 
is as if one of the firms in the industry, say firm A, could contract with another firm, firm B, to 
produce vehicles.  Vehicles produced in this manner would count ONLY as firm A’s production for 
the purpose of CAFE, as if the vehicles were produced directly by firm A and firm B had nothing to 
do with it. Firm B would therefore meet the CAFE standard based on the vehicles that counted 
towards its own production and firm A would meet the standard based on its own production plus 
the production contracted to firm B. 
That the CAFE standard would be met for the industry as a whole is easy to see.  Let ,i jM  
be the FEC held by division i  of firm j .  When the CAFE standard is applied to each firm 
independently, the system satisfies the (“material balances”) equation: 
 
                                                            , 0  i j
i
M j= ∀∑                                                                     (12). 
 
Adapting the notation of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, let ,i jq  be the number of vehicles produced by 
division i  of firm j , ,i jα  the vehicle efficiency (mpg) for the vehicles produced by it, and let K  
denote the CAFE standard. Then: 
 
         ( ), , , , i j i j i jM K q i jα= − ∀                                                       (13). 
 
Substituting (13) into (12) and simplifying, we get 
     ( ), , , , ,0  i j i j i j i j i j
i i i
K q K q q jα α− = = − ∀∑ ∑ ∑                                       (14) 
which is recognized as the CAFE standard: 
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, ,
,
i j i j
i
i j
i
q
K
q
α
=
∑
∑                                                                           (15) 
where K  is the average fuel economy for vehicles produced by the firm. 
If FEC trades across firms are allowed, the industry must satisfy the system-wide (material 
balances) equation: 
                                                       , 0  i j
j i
M =∑∑                                                                    (16). 
 
Substituting (13) into (16) and simplifying as above, we have 
                              
                                       ( ), , , , ,0i j i j i j i j i j
j i j i j i
K q K q qα α− = = −∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑                                 (17) 
 
which can be recognized as a system-wide constraint that the average fuel economy of vehicles 
collectively produced by the industry equals the CAFE standard 
                                                         
, ,
,
i j i j
j i
i j
j i
q
K
q
α
=
∑∑
∑∑                                                                    (18). 
 
Clearly, (18) is implied by (15), but the economics of (18) is not the same as that implied by (15).  
The consequences would be that, as long as all firms faced the same CAFE regulation, then the 
industry-wide mpg per vehicle produced would meet the CAFE standard.  A reasonable conjecture 
is that it would increase the number of vehicles produced, lower the social cost of meeting the 
CAFE standard and increase the incentive to create fuel efficiency technologies. Firms would be 
able to specialize in producing vehicles of various fuel efficiencies, with those firms with a 
comparative advantage in producing efficient vehicles receiving financial incentives to do so from 
the firms that produce inefficient vehicles.  
 
4. Testbed Experimental Procedures and Design 
We use an experimental methodology to explore the mechanism described in Section 2. We 
will ask two different types of questions.  (1) Does the mechanism perform as desired? That is, do 
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the aggregate, profit producing predictions hold? (2) Does the mechanism behave according the 
principles used to design it?  That is, does the mechanism do what it does for understandable 
reasons?  Basically, the strategy to test whether individuals’ system behavior and individual 
behavior are consistent with the implications of the theoretical model presented in Section 2 and to 
assess the impact of the market exchange process on the firm’s aggregate production, profits, and 
fuel economy. In the next subsections, we describe the procedures and the experimental design 
implemented in our empirical analysis.   
 
4.1 Experimental Procedures 
The subjects in the experiments were students recruited from Caltech by a general request 
for people to put themselves in a database if they were interested in participating in experiments. 
The day before the experiment, invitations were sent via e-mail recruiting subjects from that 
database. A total of 73 students participated in 8 experimental sessions, with 10 participants per 
session (some students participated in more than one session). Several of the students had prior 
experience with economics experiments in general, and few subjects also had prior experience with 
market experiments in particular. 
Experiments were computer-based, conducted in Caltech’s Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics and Political Science (EEPS); a screenshot of the software used in the experiment and 
the computer guide provided to the subjects is presented in Appendix I.3 Upon entering the lab, 
participants were randomly assigned a seat in front of a computer, an identification number (similar 
to a particular manufacturing division), and were given a set of instructions. For purposes of 
discussion in this report we will refer to the position of a subject in the experiment as a “division” 
so consistency with the model and the interpretations of the results can be maintained. The 
instructions described the general setting of the market environment, the tasks to be performed by 
the subject and the payment schemes, and included examples of how to perform the computations 
required to make the relevant decisions. In addition, each participant was provided incentives in the 
form of a series of tables with redemption values obtained from the production of the different types 
of vehicle available to him; information regarding the different mpg values was private. Each 
subject “produced” one type of vehicle, made a quantity decision regarding the production level 
                                                 
3 The software used is an adaptation of Caltech EEPS Marketscape program.  It is capable of supporting 
multiple markets and multiple production technologies. 
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and, depending on the experiment, made a choice of the mpg of the vehicle. A sample of the 
instructions is presented in Appendix II.  
Each experimental session consisted of four fifteen-minute periods, preceded by a fifteen 
minute practice period for which subjects did not receive payment. During each period, asks and 
bids for FEC were recorded in an open book, and transactions were conducted in an open market, 
with information on prices and quantities traded publicly observed in continuous time. At the end of 
each period, subjects were given 5 minutes to record their earnings and the trades they had made in 
the FEC market. At the end of the session they were asked to compute their total earnings and 
submit the final amount to the experimenters; the calculations were verified by the experimenters, 
based on the computer logs. Subjects earned between $10 and $60 for a two-hour experiment, 
depending on their performance, with most subjects earning close to an average of $40. 
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
Two different experimental designs were implemented, Design A and Design B.  In each 
design subjects made decisions regarding production levels. In Design B, subjects also made 
decisions about the mpg of the vehicle.  
Design A) Fixed MPG: each subject was assigned a predetermined mpg value for the 
vehicle production the subject controlled and was not allowed to change it during the experiment. 
Subjects had to decide their optimal production level given their mpg constraints, taking into 
account profits from the sales of vehicles and sales/purchases of FEC in the FEC market. 
Design B) Variable MPG: each subject was provided four possible levels of mpg. The 
choice of mpg influenced vehicle sale profitability. In the first period of the experiment, subjects 
were assigned a predetermined mpg value as in design A and had to choose only the production 
level. In the second and later periods, subjects had to choose both the efficiency level of the vehicle 
– defined by the mpg value - and the production level.  
Three experiments of Design A and five experiments of Design B were conducted. In both 
experimental designs, the CAFE mpg requirement – the value of K , in Section 2 -  was set to 20.  
In experiments in which design A was implemented, 4 subjects were assigned mpg values higher 
than 20 – i.e., they produced fuel-efficient vehicles and were thus sellers of FCE -, 5 subjects were 
assigned mpg values lower than 20 – they produced fuel-inefficient vehicles and were buyers of 
FCE -, and one agent was assigned mpg of 20.  In experiments in which design B was implemented, 
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5 subjects were sellers of mpg and 5 subjects were buyers of FCE in equilibrium. Subjects’ profits 
are determined as follows:  
FEC buyers:  Profit = Value received from vehicles produced - cost of FEC for the 
production of vehicles 
FEC sellers:  Profit = Value received from vehicles produced + revenue received from the 
sale of FEC where, as mentioned in the introduction, both vehicle cost and market demand are 
known for given vehicle characteristics and production levels.  
 Subjects’ values were generated according to the following formula, which is the 
experimental equivalent of a net profit function before any internal tax or transfer price for a 
vehicle:  
                                           
25Total Value = 100 Q  - Q
2
Marginal (unit Value) = 100s -5s Q
s s
s
ss×
×
                                                 (12) 
 
where: s can be interpreted as the size or the weight of a vehicle type r  and sQ  is the number of 
unites produced of vehicle of size s .  
Let ( )s sY Kα= −  denote the mpg value of a vehicle of size s  in excess of the CAFE mpg 
requirement, where, as mentioned above, we set 4020K
s
= = , so that 40s sYsα = + . Then, denoting 
by z the Lagrangian multiplier, we have: 
 
1/4 25 40100 3.125 20
2 s s s s s ss s s
s Q Q s Y z Y Q Q
s
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − × × + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑                                (13) 
 
with first order conditions 
( ) 1/4 2 40 100 -5 -  [ 3.125 ]  20 0s ss Qs s Y z Ys
⎛ ⎞× × + + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                      (14) 
and                                 1/4-[ 3.125  2 ]     0 s s ss Y Q z Q× × + =                                                      (15). 
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From equation (14), the equilibrium FEC price is z times the difference between the mpg of a 
vehicle of size s  and 20; from equation (15), 1/4[ 3.125  2 ]  sz s Y= × × , which is additional cost per 
vehicle due to a marginal increase in fuel economy.  
 The parameters of both experimental designs are summarized in Tables 1 and 2; the set of 
redemption values for each of the mpg values available for experimental subjects is presented in 
Appendix III.  
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
Figure 1 below presents the equilibrium in FEC market resulting from the demand and 
supply of FEC induced by the parameters in the two experimental designs.4  
[Figure 1 here] 
Given the parameters and the resulting equilibria for each experimental design, Table 3 
compares the system-wide production, profit and fuel-efficiency levels under three alternative 
baseline scenarios: a) The centralized (mathematical) optimum subject to CAFE constraint; b) the 
equilibrium that would exist if no CAFE regulations exist; and c) a natural administrative response 
to CAFE: leaving untouched the production of vehicles that have mpg above CAFE and 
proportionally scaling back the production of all vehicles with mpg less than CAFE until the overall 
CAFE standard is met.  For both experimental designs, the aggregate production and fuel-efficiency 
levels under the mathematical optimum subject to the CAFE constraint are higher than in the 
scenario with no CAFE constraint, and it the centralized solution also leads to higher production 
and profit levels than the administrative response.  
[Table 3 here] 
5. Empirical results 
The results are divided into three parts. The first part overviews our main findings about 
prices and quantities traded in the FEC market. The second part reports the subject’s vehicle-
production and the system efficiency levels attained under both experimental designs. Finally, the 
third part presents the aggregate results regarding the firm’s production, profits from vehicles 
                                                 
4 In the case of Design B, Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium in the FEC market for periods 2 – 4, in which 
subjects choose both the fuel-efficiency and the production levels of the vehicles; the equilibrium for period 
1 is the same as under Design A.  
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produced and average fuel-efficiency and compares them to the results obtained under the 
alternative baseline scenarios described in Table 3. 
 
5.1 Prices and quantities traded in the FEC market  
Figures 2 and 3 plot the time-series of the trade prices in the FEC market for all experiments 
under Designs A and B, respectively. As is clear from the figures, trade prices exhibit considerable 
variability, particularly under the variable mpg design (Design B). Note, however, that prices tend 
to converge to the equilibrium level as time goes on. This pattern is evident in Figure 2: under the 
fixed mpg design, the initial trades take place at relatively high prices, but convergence towards the 
equilibrium is observed at the end of virtually every period. In the case of the variable mpg design, 
the “learning” process takes considerably more time due to the complexities induced by the 
different mpg choices available for each subject and the fact that subjects shift from an initial period 
in which the mpg values are given (Period 1) to choosing both the fuel-efficiency and the 
production levels of the vehicles they produce. Nonetheless, despite the difficulties involved in 
Design B, Figure 3 indicates that trade prices also tend to converge to the equilibrium levels as 
subjects’ performance improves with experience; averaged over the entire experiment, trade prices 
tend to be relatively close to the equilibrium price, and in fact the average of Period-4 trade prices 
for all experiments under Design B 17.85, quite near to the equilibrium level of 16 represented in 
Figure 1.    
[Figure 2 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
In order to examine convergence of prices towards the equilibrium-level, we regressed the 
distance between the observed and the equilibrium prices on the time of the transactions for all 
sessions under each experimental design, where we used the ordinal measure of time that is updated 
after each trade (Hirota, Hsu, Plott and Rogers, 2005). We fit a simple fixed effects model in which 
a common time-slope is assumed for all the sessions under each experimental design while the 
intercept is allowed to vary from session to session.  
*
0 1 Session  Time + t tP P β β ε− = +  
where *P  is the FEC equilibrium price under each experimental design.  The results, reported in 
Table 4, show that the prices move towards the equilibrium-level under both Design A and Design 
B. The movement towards the equilibrium price is on average 0.04 francs with each trade for 
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Design A, and 0.07 francs for Design B. In both cases, the coefficients of time are significant at the 
0.01 level.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
In addition, Spearman's rho (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) for the association between the 
price changes between in the FEC market, 1 1t t tP P P+ +Δ = − , and the excess demand of the previous 
period, t t tED D S= − , is  0.21 under both experimental designs, and the hypothesis of a null or 
negative correlation between both variables can be rejected at the 0.01 level. Thus, these results 
indicate that, despite the complexity of the market architecture used in the experiment, price 
dynamics in the FEC market is in line with the predictions of the classical theory of economic 
dynamics (McKenzie, 2002; Mukherji, 2002, 2003). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
convergence towards the equilibrium-level price under the variable mpg design tends to occur 
despite the fact that subjects do not necessarily choose the optimal mpg value for the vehicles they 
produce. Figure 4 plots the choice of mpg values for each subject under Design B, discriminated by 
period. As seen in the Figure, there is wide variation in the pattern and timing of choices among 
divisions and experiments. For some divisions and experiments, mpg choices “overshoot” and then 
pullback, indicating that the market is guiding the divisions through disequilibria towards the 
optimum; in some other cases, subjects fail to choose the fuel-efficiency level of their vehicles in 
accordance with the theoretical predictions. 
[Figure 4 here] 
Table 5 presents the average FEC traded in each round of every experiment under Designs A 
and B, as percentage of the equilibrium quantities reported in Figure 1. In virtually all of the 
experiments, the average volume of FEC actually traded in the market is around or above 90% of 
the equilibrium volume, though, again, variability is much higher under Design B. In the fixed mpg 
design, quantities traded as a percentage of the equilibrium volume tend to increase rapidly during 
the first rounds of the experiments. The pattern of trades is less clear in the variable mpg design: in 
some experiments (e.g., 09/23/2007 and 11/13/2007) trading is very high during the first period and 
tends to stabilize as time goes on, while in others (e.g., 11/11/2007) trades show substantial 
fluctuations over periods. Overall, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variance of 
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efficiency levels under Design B is not statistically different from those under Design A at the usual 
confidence levels.5  
[Table 5 here] 
 
5.2 Vehicle production and efficiency levels 
Figures 5 and 6 plot the average production levels by division and period under both 
experimental designs. The evidence presented in both figures indicates that observed production 
convergence towards vehicle-production equilibrium levels tends to occur faster and more smoothly 
under Design A. Under Design B, there is more disparity between divisions and, in particular, some 
of the divisions producing fuel-efficient vehicles tend to produce more than the equilibrium quantity 
in response to high FEC prices.  
[Figure 5 here] 
[Figure 6 here] 
Two-sample t-tests for the absolute value of the difference between the theoretical 
equilibrium and the per-period observed production for each division under both designs show that 
differences tend to be larger under Design B for many of the divisions (Table 6). Nonetheless, as 
seen in Figure 6, even in the variable mpg design observed production levels tend to approach the 
theoretical equilibrium as the number of periods increase, again suggesting that subjects’ and 
system’s performance tends to increase with experience.  
[Table 6 here] 
In order to further explore subjects’ behavioral patterns regarding vehicle production, we run 
a Poisson regression for the absolute value of the difference between the theoretical equilibrium and 
the observed production as dependent variable. The predictors included in the model are: Period;  
Price, measured as between the average trade prices in the FEC market during the period; Design B, 
a dummy variable for the variable-mpg design; and Fuel Efficiency, measured in miles-per-gallon. 
The latter variable was coded in two different ways: i) as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 
1 for fuel economy efficient divisions – i.e., those with mpg values over 20 – and 0 for fuel 
economy inefficient divisions (Specification 1); and ii) on an eight point-scale, in ascending order 
according to each division’s mpg value (Specification 2).  The basic model is then: 
                                                 
5 The p-values of  Bartlett's and Fligner-Killeen’ tests of the null hypothesis that the variances in efficiency levels under 
the two experimental designs are the same are 0.11 and 0.53, respectively (Bartlett, 1937; Conover, Johnson and 
Johnson, 1981) 
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where ,i tY  is the observed production for division i  at period t , and 
*
iY is the theoretical equilibrium 
production level for that division, under each experimental design. 
The results of both specifications, reported in Table 7, are in line with our expectations: the 
differences between the observed production quantities and the theoretical equilibrium production 
quantities decline with the number of periods, and they are larger for high fuel-efficiency divisions 
and for the variable-mpg design. Our results imply that, ceteris paribus, the differences under the 
variable mpg design are 2.2 units higher across subjects than under the fixed mpg design, and that, 
for a given design, the differences are 2.4 units larger for fuel-efficient divisions. In contrast, the 
average trade price in the FEC market has no impact on the dependent variable after controlling for 
the other regressors; the reason for this is that, as seen in Figures 2 and 3, trade prices tend to 
decline with the number of periods.6   
[Table 7 here] 
In line with the definition of experimental market efficiency first developed by Plott and 
Smith (1978), we measure efficiency levels as the ratio between the actual profits obtained from 
vehicles produced to the maximum possible profits subject to the CAFE constraint. Table 8 reports 
the efficiency levels attained in the three experiments conducted under Design A and the five 
experiments conducted under Design B.  
[Table 8 here] 
Again, efficiency levels under both experimental designs tend to increase over the periods. 
However, some interesting differences emerge between the experimental designs, illustrating the 
higher complexity of the variable mpg design from the perspective of subjects’ decision-making 
process. For Design A, efficiency levels increase almost uniformly with the number of periods and 
become close to the maximum possible under such constraint, indicating that that the choice of 
vehicle production levels approaches the optimum. Efficiency levels under Design B also tend to 
increase with the number of periods, illustrating that the choice of vehicle moves in the optimum 
                                                 
6 The results remain virtually identical if Price is defined as the difference between the average trade price in 
each period and the equilibrium price. 
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direction and the vehicle production levels given mpg choice are also moving the direction of 
greatest profitability as the number of periods increase. However, efficiency is much more variable 
both across periods and experiments under Design B when compared to Design A.  Moreover, for 
one of the sessions (11/11/2007), some subjects apparently failed to understand the total impact on 
profits of changing mpg, and thus did not adjust their mpg choice in the direction implied by the 
theoretical model.  
Figure 7 allows us to contrast the relative efficiency attained under both experimental 
designs, comparing the efficiency levels in experiments with fixed and variable mpg to a baseline 
level determined by the maximum possible profitability with mpg fixed divided by maximum 
possible potential profits if the mpg is not fixed.  
[Figure 7 here] 
The evidence presented in Figure 7 reveals that substantive efficiency gains result not only 
from better coordinated output levels, but also from changing the mpg values in those experiments 
in which the mpg was allowed to be determined endogenously. Also, note that in the session 
conducted on 11/11/2007, the failure of some subjects to adjust their mpg choice led to relative 
efficiency levels that are close to those attained under Design A. Nonetheless, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the relative efficiency levels under Design B are higher than under Design A: 
the p-value of the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test (Hogg, McKean and Craig, 2005) for the null 
hypothesis Relative Efficiency Relative Efficiency 0A B− ≤  is 0.982, and 0.991 when stratified by 
period. 
 
5.3 Aggregate Scenario Comparisons 
In this section we compare the experimental results regarding the vehicle-manufacturer’s 
production, profit from vehicle production and average fuel-efficiency levels with those obtained 
under three baseline scenarios described in Section 3. Table 9 presents the results for both 
experimental designs, where the experimental outcomes are averaged over all periods and 
experiments.  
Despite the fact that subjects often failed to adjust completely according to the theoretical 
model7, the comparison of the results reported in Table 9 with those in Table 3 shows that the 
experimental outcomes under Designs A and B are relatively close to the centralized (mathematical) 
                                                 
7 See Section 4.1 of this report. 
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optimum subject to the CAFE standard regulation. Hence, the system-wide results seem to be quite 
robust to miscalculations and poor performance of individual agents. Moreover, production and 
average fuel-efficiency levels of the vehicles produced are on average higher than in the scenario 
with no CAFE constraint. The p-values of the signed-rank Wilcoxon tests (Hollander and Wolfe, 
1999) for the hypothesis that the per-period experimental production levels are equal or greater than 
in the equilibrium without the CAFE constraint are 0.94 for Design A and 0.99 for Design B, and 
the hypothesis that the efficiency levels are less or equal than in the scenario with no regulation are 
rejected at the 0.1 level for both experimental designs. Also, as seen in Table 9, the decentralized 
decision-making process leads to substantially higher profits and production levels than those 
obtained using proportional rescaling (administrative response). 
[Table 9 here] 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper analyzes methods that can be used to enable a vehicle manufacturer to meet the 
CAFE standards most profitably while operating as a decentralized organization with no centralized 
administrative decision-maker. Specifically, we examine the functioning of an internal market for 
Fuel Efficiency Credits (FEC) with organized trading and FCE pricing between the different 
divisions of the manufacturing firm. A testbed experimental strategy is used to assess the reliability 
of an underlying theoretical model of how such a market will operate and the effects of this market 
institution on the firm’s production, profits and overall fuel-efficiency. The experiments establish 
“proof of principle” that the internal market designed in accord with the theory produces high 
efficiency levels and increased profitability.  Furthermore, the testbed demonstrates the property of 
“design consistency” in the sense that the theory of behavior that underlies the theory is observed in 
the decision choices at the individual division level. The experimental evidence presented in Section 
5 suggests that high efficiency levels are attained, relatively easy adaptation and learning on the part 
of subjects is observed, and that the results are robust to miscalculations and poor performance of 
individual agents. The vehicle-manufacturer’s performance, as measured by vehicle production, and 
profits, is substantially enhanced through the decentralized decision-making process that is 
consistent with the CAFE standard regulation, compared to alternative administrative responses 
available in the absence of an internal market for FEC.  
The technology used for the experiments in this paper can be modified to account for 
additional complexities or adapted to address other issues or policy proposals concerning the 
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automobile industry. For instance, Ellerman, Jacoby and Zimmerman (2006) consider the problem 
of integrating the CAFE program with a cap-and-trade system aimed at mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions using some form of tradable instrument related to vehicle characteristics, such as fuel 
economy. The theoretical framework and the experimental strategy implemented in this paper can 
be easily extended to study this possibility. In addition, the theory underlying our work supports a 
natural generalization of regulatory policy to the case in which fuel efficiency credit trading 
between firms is allowed. In this context, there would be a single FEC traded in an open market 
among firms, with production and use being essentially analogous as in this paper. In the simplest 
case of a two-firm example, the implication would be as if firm A contracted with firm B for the 
production of vehicles; the vehicles produced by firm B would not be used in applying the CAFE 
standard to firm B but the vehicles would be used when applying the CAFE standard to firm A. We 
leaver these possible extensions of our work for further research.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 - Parameters of Experimental Design A 
Subject ID s  (size of vehicle) MPG 
Equilibrium 
production of 
vehicles 
FEC bought 
(sold) in 
equilibrium 
1 1.5 26.7 43 (287) 
2 15 2.7 13 242 
3 8.75 4.6 10 167 
4 1.75 22.9 28 81 
5 9 4.4 11 171 
6 9.75 4.1 12 183 
7 1.5 26.7 43 (287) 
8 9.5 4.2 11 179 
9 1.5 26.7 43 (287) 
10 2 20.0 20 0 
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Table 2 - Parameters of Experimental Design B 
Subject 
ID 
s   
(size of 
vehicle) 
Original 
MPG 
Alternative MPG 
choices 
Equilibrium 
MPG 
Equilibrium 
production 
of vehicles 
FEC 
bought 
(sold) in 
equilibrium
1 1.5 26.7 27.9 28.9 29.9 28.9 36 (317) 
2 15 2.7 2.9 3.9 4.9 3.9 17 267 
3 8.75 4.6 5.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 15 208 
4 1.75 22.9 24.0 25.0 26.9 25.0 27 (133) 
5 9 4.4 4.9 5.9 6.9 5.9 15 211 
6 9.75 4.1 4.5 5.5 6.5 5.5 15 222 
7 1.5 26.7 27.9 28.9 29.9 28.9 36 (317) 
8 9.5 4.2 4.6 5.6 6.6 5.6 15 218 
9 1.5 26.7 27.9 28.9 29.9 28.9 36 (317) 
10 2 20.0 21.1 22.1 23.1 22.1 22 (44) 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the FEC market for the two experimental designs 
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Table 3 – Comparison of production, profit and fuel-efficiency levels: 
Alternative baseline scenarios 
 Centralized 
optimum 
No CAFE 
regulation 
Administrative 
response (proportional 
rescaling) 
Design A – Fixed mpg    
Production 
(number of vehicles) 
234 200 128 
Profits 
(experiment money)  
42,473 60,250 33,483 
Fuel-efficiency 
(mpg) 
20.11 14.29 20.07 
    
Design B – Variable mpg    
Production  
(number of vehicles) 
233 200 142 
Profits 
(experiment money)  
48,992 60,250 40,612 
Fuel-efficiency 
(mpg) 
20.03 14.29 21.71 
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Figure 2 – Trade prices in the FEC market  
Design A: Fixed mpg  
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Figure 3 – Trade prices in the FEC market  
Design B: Variable mpg  
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Table 4 – Parameter estimates of the regression of price-equilibrium price 
 on transaction times 
 (standard deviations in parenthesis) 
 Design A Design B 
Transaction time 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Session 1 
8.62*** 
(0.35) 
9.39*** 
(0.64) 
Session 2 
9.54*** 
(0.35) 
10.40*** 
(0.63) 
Session 3 
6.29*** 
(0.34) 
7.28*** 
(0.63) 
Session 4 
 8.96*** 
(0.65) 
Session 5 
 18.15*** 
(0.73) 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.62 
F-Statistic 302*** 150*** 
N 666 757 
                                 Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1. 
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Figure 4 – Choice of mpg value by subject and by period, Design B 
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Table 5 – FEC traded, as percentage of equilibrium quantities 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 All periods*
Design A – Fixed mpg      
04/03/2007 88.77 96.08 90.15 95.02 92.51 
(3.59) 
06/21/2007 83.58 99.79 98.83 95.23 94.36 
(7.45) 
07/04/2007 88.61 92.01 92.49 94.44 91.89 
(2.43) 
      
Design B – Variable mpg      
09/23/2007 105.97 85.49 97.31 91.00 94.94 
(7.62) 
10/11/2007 90.43 87.59 93.35 92.11 90.87 
(2.49) 
10/26/2007 91.37 92.45 91.47 86.52 90.45 
(2.67) 
11/11/2007 95.87 80.76 103.28 77.75 89.41 
(12.18) 
11/13/2007 113.98 88.12 95.30 89.89 96.82 
(11.84) 
    * Sample standard deviations reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 5 – Production by division and period, Design A 
 
Note: White bars represent experiment output and black bars represent the equilibrium production.     
The horizontal line indicates the equilibrium production without the CAFE standard regulation. 
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Figure 6 – Production by division and period, Design B 
 
Note: White bars represent experiment output and black bars represent the equilibrium production.     
The horizontal line indicates the equilibrium production without the CAFE standard regulation. 
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Table 6 – Two-sample t-tests for the absolute value of the difference 
 between the equilibrium and the per-period experimental output under both designs1 
Estimated mean difference between equilibrium 
and per-period observed production Subject 
Design A Design B 
p-value of the two-
sample t-test2 
1 9.3 14.4 0.50 
2 3.8 1.7 0.55 
3 0.75 5.0 0.02 
4 0.75 2.78 0.05 
5 1.0 2.9 0.15 
6 1.3 3.6 0.15 
7 2.3 8.1 0.03 
8 0.25 3.89 0.03 
9 2.8 14.6 0.01 
10 0.25 2.22 0.08 
1 There are 12 observations for each division under Design A, and 20 under Design B. 
2 Two-sided. 
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Table 7 – Estimates of the Poisson regression 
(standard deviations in parenthesis) 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Intercept 
1.69*** 
(0.48) 
0.78 
(0.5) 
Period 
-0.38*** 
(0.07) 
-0.38*** 
(0.07) 
Price 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
Design B 
0.79*** 
(0.11) 
0.79*** 
(0.11) 
Fuel Efficiency   
Dummy
0.89*** 
(0.09) 
 
                Scale  0.24*** 
(0.02) 
Null Deviance 882.21 882.21 
Residual Deviance 675.42 606.31 
AIC  1014 945.2 
N 320 320 
                                 Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1. 
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Table 8 – Efficiency levels per period, Designs A and B 
Experiment Efficiency levels (%) 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Design A – Fixed mpg     
04/03/2007 86.60 94.31 95.23 99.11 
06/21/2007 91.86 96.17 96.48 99.79 
07/04/2007 84.54 97.16 98.19 99.87 
     
Design B – Variable mpg     
09/23/2007 91.17 92.95 91.06 93.47 
10/11/2007 69.87 87.91 95.62 85.78 
10/26/2007 84.9 90.8 93.1 94.5 
11/11/2007 84.15 81.29 84.09 80.73 
11/13/2007 76.57 87.64 93.71 91.61 
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Figure 7 – Relative efficiency levels under Designs A and B 
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Table 9– System-wide production, profit and fuel-efficiency levels 
under designs A and B* 
 Design A Design B 
Production 
(number of vehicles) 
221 
(22.41) 
220 
(19.43) 
Profits 
(experiment money)  
40,706 
(2,167.37) 
43,201 
(5,401.57) 
Fuel-efficiency 
(mpg) 
20.08 
(0.42) 
19.56 
(1.43) 
                                                      * Sample standard deviations reported in parenthesis. 
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Appendix I – Computer Screen Guide 
 
FEC market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicate the quantity you 
want to buy or sell 
Indicate the 
price you 
want to pay 
or receive 
for each 
FEC 
Indicate if you want to buy 
or sell FECs 
Time remaining to make 
transactions 
Summary information 
about the market 
Press to put your order in the 
market. Otherwise, press 
clear 
Press RELOAD to actualize 
your screen each time you 
change any input 
Press to see your 
production plan 
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Production screen 
 
  
 
 
 
Input new 
vehicle 
production Change in Redemption Value / Change in FECs. 
Press if you accept 
the changes; 
otherwise, press 
clear 
Press to calculate the 
changes with the 
new production plan
FECs used 
in 
production 
of vehicles 
FECs not used in the 
production of 
vehicles (e.g., 
available for sale, if 
positive, or required 
to buy, if negative) 
Your 
current 
vehicle 
production 
Your 
current 
MPG  
Input new  
MPG 
choice 
2  
Inventory screen 
 
 
 
 
Current inventories 
Inventories at the 
beginning of each period 
Current MPG 
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Appendix II – Instructions  
 
You are about to participate in a special market process that will consist of a number of independent 
periods or “days”.  If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a 
considerable amount of money. You will be paid in EC 11 credits at the end of the experiment. The 
currency used in the experiment is called francs, but your credits will be computed in US Dollars, at 
an exchange rate of ________________ 
 
Please do not talk or in any way communicate with other participants. If you have a question or 
problem, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. 
 
You will find attached a payoff sheet that will describe the value to you of your decisions, a key to 
the functions used on the computer and a record of earnings sheet. 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
In this experiment, you are placed in a position of a vehicle manufacturer who operates under 
specific economic and regulatory constraints.  
 
Each period, the value to you of producing “vehicle” units are contained in your redemption value 
table found attached to these instructions. Think of redemption values as the amount of profit you 
can make each period from the sale of the units you produce that period.  
 
When producing your vehicles, you will deal with a regulation called “Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy” (CAFE). This means that your decisions will be closely aligned with a special market for 
fuel efficiency credits (FEC).  
 
The impact of the regulation depends on the fuel efficiency of your vehicle, measured in miles per 
gallon (mpg). The mpg of your vehicle determines what you must do or what you are able to do in 
the FEC market. You will be originally assigned a certain mpg that you will find on your 
redemption value table and in your computer screen. 
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 If the mpg of your vehicle is BELOW 20, then you are required to deposit FEC with each 
vehicle you produce.  If you do not have the FEC required by the amount that you want to 
produce, then you must buy them on the FEC market. For each vehicle you produce you will 
need FEC equal to 20 minus the mpg of your vehicle.   
 
 If the mpg of your vehicle is ABOVE 20, then you receive new FEC with each additional 
vehicle produced. The FEC you receive can then be sold in the FEC market for profit. For each 
vehicle you produce, you will receive FEC equal to the mpg of your vehicle minus 20.   
 
 If you buy FEC you spend francs and if you sell FEC you receive francs. You are given a loan 
of 200,000 francs each period. This loan must be repaid at the end of the experiment.  
 
 
 PROFIT DETERMINATION, REDEMPTION VALUE TABLES AND EARNINGS 
The information regarding the redemption values and the FEC requirements from the production of 
vehicles is given in your Redemption Value Table. Consider the following two cases:  
 
CASE ONE: The mpg of your vehicle is BELOW 20. 
 
 If the mpg of your vehicle is BELOW 20 then your profit is: 
 
Profit = Value received from vehicles produced – cost of FEC for the production of the 
vehicles. 
 
 
EXAMPLE 1) Your mpg is below 20, so you must buy and use FEC with each vehicle unit 
produced.  Suppose your Redemption Value Table is like Table 1, and you have produced 4 units 
and have an MPG of 2.67.  
Column (C), labeled “unit redemption value”, gives you the INCREMENTAL redemption value for 
each unit produced (e.g., 1200 francs for the 4th unit produce and 1125 for the 5th unit).  
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Column (D), labeled “total of redemption values”, gives the SUM of the INCREMENTAL 
redemption values of the units you produce (e.g. 5250 francs if you produce 4 units and 6375 if 5).  
Column (E), labeled “FEC REQUIRED per unit”, indicates the number of FCE you need to buy for 
each vehicle you produce: 17.33.  
Column (G) gives you the redemption value per FEC obtained per unit of vehicle produced.   
 
Table 1 – Redemption values 
(A) 
Unit 
(B) 
Your 
MPG 
(C) 
Unit 
(incremental) 
redemption 
value 
(D) 
Total of 
redemption 
values 
(E)  FEC 
REQUIRED per 
unit: 
20 - (B) 
(F) Total FEC 
REQUIRED: 
(E)*(A) 
(G) Redemption value 
per FEC REQUIRED 
by unit produced: 
(C) / (E) 
1 2.67 1425 1425 20-2.67=17.33 17.33 *1=17.33 1425/17.33 = 82.23 
2 2.67 1350 2775 20-2.67=17.33 17.33 * 2 =34.66 1350/17.33 = 77.90 
3 2.67 1275 4050 20-2.67=17.33 17.33 * 3 = 51.99 1275/17.33 = 73.57 
4 2.67 1200 5250 20-2.67=17.33 17.33 * 4 =69.32 1200/17.33 = 69.24 
5 2.67 1125 6375 20-2.67=17.33 86.65 1125 / 17.33 =64.92 
… 2.67 … ... 20-2.67=17.33 .... ... 
20 2.67 0 14250 20-2.67=17.33 346.6 0/17.33 = 0 
21 2.67 -75 14175 20-2.67=17.33 363.93 -75 / 17/33 = -4.33 
... .. ...  ... ... ... 
 
So long as you pay less for the FEC needed to produce an incremental unit that the incremental 
redemption value for the unit, the unit is profitable for you. Notice that the INCREMENTAL 
redemption values are positive up to several units and then can become negative. If the required 
FEC for the unit are acquired at a per unit price below the figure in column (G), then the 
FEC purchase together with the unit production is profitable. 
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CASE TWO: The mpg of your vehicle is ABOVE 20.  
 
If the MPG of your vehicle is ABOVE 20 then your profit is: 
 
 Profit = Value received from vehicles produced  + revenue received from the sale of FEC 
 
 
EXAMPLE 2) Your vehicle mpg is above 20, so you obtain FEC along with each vehicle unit 
produced. You can sell the FEC you obtain. Suppose your redemption value table is like Table 2, 
and you have produced 4 units and have an mpg of 22.9.  
Column (C), labeled “unit redemption value”, gives you the INCREMENTAL redemption value for 
each unit produced (e.g., -8.75 francs for the 4th unit produce and -17.5 for the 5th unit).  It is as if 
you are producing the vehicles at a loss (not including possible sale of the FEC obtained). 
Column (D), labeled “total of redemption values”, gives the SUM of the INCREMENTAL 
redemption values of the units you produce (e.g. 315 francs if you produce 4 units and 297.5 if 5).  
Column (E), labeled “FEC OBTAINED per unit”, indicates the number of FEC you obtain from 
each incremental vehicle you produce: 2.9.  
Column (F), labeled Total FEC OBTAINED is the sum of all or the FEC obtained from all 
incremental units.  
Column (G) gives you the redemption value per FEC obtained per unit of vehicle produced.  
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Table 2 – Redemption values 
(A) 
Unit 
(B) 
Your 
MPG 
(C) 
Unit 
(incremental) 
redemption 
value 
(D) 
Total of 
redemption 
values 
(E)  FEC 
OBTAINED 
per 
incremental 
unit: 
(B) - 20 
(F) Total FEC 
OBTAINED 
(E)*(A) 
(G) Redemption value 
per FEC OBTAINED 
by unit produced: 
(C) / (E) 
1 22.9 166.25 166.25 22.9-20=2.9 2.9 *1=2.9 166.25/2.9 = 57.33 
2 22.9 157.5 323.75 22.9-20=2.9 2.9 * 2 =5.8 157.5/2.9 = 54.31 
3 22.9 0 323.75 22.9-20=2.9 2.9 * 3 = 8.7 0/2.9 = 0 
4 22.9 -8.75 315 22.9-20=2.9 2.4 * 4 =11.6 -8.75/2.9 = -3.02 
5 22.9 -17.5 297.5 22.9-20=2.9 2.9 * 5 =14.5 -17.5/2.9 = -6.03 
6 22.9 -26.25 271.25 22.9-20=2.9 2.9*6=17.4 26.25/2.9 = -9.05 
.., .., .., .., .., .., … 
10 22.9 -61.25 57.15 22.9-20=2.9 2.9*10=29 -61.25/2.9 = -21.12 
11 22.9 -70 -12.85 22.9–20=2.9 2.9 * 11=31.9 -70/2.9 = -24.14 
… … … … … … .. 
.   
The fact that the incremental redemption values are negative means that producing the unit will 
reduce your profit unless the loss from production is offset by the gain in revenue from the sale of 
FEC.  Column (G) will help you in making this calculation.  It can be viewed as the cost to you of 
obtaining incremental FEC. For example, if you are producing 4 vehicles, the additional FEC you 
obtain from producing the 5th vehicle will cost you 6.03 per FEC obtained. If the prices received 
for the FEC obtained by the production of the unit are on average below the figure in column 
(G), then the production together with the sale of the FEC is profitable. 
 
 
CHANGING YOUR MPG PERFORMANCE: 
In the first period of the experiment, you will have to produce vehicles with the mpg value that is 
originally assigned to you. In the following periods, you can choose to change the mpg of the 
vehicles you produce. Changing your mpg will affect the values you will receive for the vehicles 
produced and the FEC you will sell or buy in the FCE market. You can choose the mpg of the 
vehicles you produce at any time during these periods, but will have to produce only one type of car 
6  
–defined by its mpg - in each period. In order to choose your desired mpg level, you are given a 
payoff sheet for different possible mpg values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unit (incremental) and total redemption values for alternative mpg performances 
 Your current mpg 
Alternative mpg values 
 
mpg=26.7 Mpg=27.87 mpg=28.87 mpg=29.87 Units 
produced UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL 
1 146 146 141 141 130 130 112 112 
2 139 285 134 275 123 253 105 217 
3 131 416 126 402 115 368 97 314 
4 124 540 119 521 108 476 90 404 
… … … … … … … … … 
 
 
Earnings record sheet  
 
Your earnings during the periods are the differences between the redemption values you receive for 
units and the costs or receipts that you derive from the FEC market. The record sheet will help you 
compute your earnings each period. Your end of period earnings are calculated using the total 
redemption value of the vehicles produced and substracting (adding) the value of your purchases 
(sales) of FEC.  
 
RECORD YOUR EARNINGS AFTER EACH ROUND OF THE EXPERIMENT. Your end of 
period earnings will be listed in the PAYOFF SUMMARY screen of your computer.  
1  
 
Table 3  - Record of earnings sheet 
PERIOD 1 number TOTAL OF 
REDEMPTION 
VALUES 
vehicle 
commitment 
(a) 
(c) 
Initial francs 200,000  
final francs            (b) 
 
 
CHANGE of 
francs 
 
(d) 
TOTAL 
EARNINGS 
 (c) - (d)  
 
ID: 1, 7, 9 
 
 
 
 
Input the number of cars 
you plan to produce in 
the period 
Input the amount of 
francs you have at the 
end of the period 
Difference 
between 200,000 
and your final 
amount of francs 
(recorded in cell 
b).
Input the 
redemption values 
of the cars you 
plan to produce 
Notice: (d) is positive if buying FEC 
and (d) is negative if selling FEC, so 
use subtraction in both cases. 
1  
 Appendix III – Redemption values tables  
ID: 1, 7, 9 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
Total value UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 146 146 141 141 130 130 112 112
2 285 139 275 134 253 123 217 105
3 416 131 402 126 368 115 314 97
4 540 124 521 119 476 108 404 90
5 656 116 632 111 576 100 486 82
6 765 109 736 104 668 93 560 75
7 866 101 833 96 753 85 627 67
8 960 94 922 89 831 78 687 60
9 1046 86 1003 81 901 70 739 52
10 1125 79 1077 74 964 63 784 45
11 1196 71 1144 66 1019 55 821 37
12 1260 64 1203 59 1067 48 851 30
13 1316 56 1254 51 1107 40 873 22
14 1365 49 1298 44 1139 33 887 15
15 1406 41 1334 36 1164 25 894 7
16 1440 34 1363 29 1182 18 894 0
17 1466 26 1385 21 1192 10 886 -8
18 1485 19 1399 14 1195 3 871 -15
19 1496 11 1405 6 1190 -5 848 -23
20 1500 4 1404 -1 1178 -12 818 -30
21 1496 -4 1396 -9 1158 -20 780 -38
22 1485 -11 1380 -16 1130 -27 734 -45
23 1466 -19 1356 -24 1095 -35 681 -53
24 1440 -26 1325 -31 1053 -42 621 -60
25 1406 -34 1286 -39 1003 -50 553 -68
26 1365 -41 1240 -46 946 -57 478 -75
27 1316 -49 1187 -54 881 -65 395 -83
28 1260 -56 1126 -61 809 -72 305 -90
29 1196 -64 1057 -69 729 -80 207 -98
30 1125 -71 981 -76 641 -87 101 -105
31 1046 -79 898 -84 546 -95 -12 -113
32 960 -86 807 -91 444 -102 -132 -120
33 866 -94 708 -99 334 -110 -260 -128
34 765 -101 602 -106 217 -117 -395 -135
35 656 -109 489 -114 92 -125 -538 -143
36 540 -116 368 -121 -40 -132 -688 -150
37 416 -124 239 -129 -180 -140 -846 -158
38 285 -131 103 -136 -328 -147 -1012 -165
39 146 -139 -41 -144 -482 -155 -1185 -173
40 0 -146 -192 -151 -645 -162 -1365 -180
41 -154 -154 -350 -159 -815 -170 -1553 -188
42 -315 -161 -516 -166 -992 -177 -1748 -195
43 -484 -169 -690 -174 -1177 -185 -1951 -203
44 -660 -176 -871 -181 -1369 -192 -2161 -210
45 -844 -184 -1059 -189 -1569 -200 -2379 -218
Units MPG=29.87MPG=26.67 MPG=27.87 MPG=28.87
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ID: 2 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 1463 1463 1462 1462 1453 1453 1432 1432
2 2850 1388 2849 1387 2832 1378 2790 1357
3 4163 1313 4161 1312 4135 1303 4072 1282
4 5400 1238 5399 1237 5363 1228 5280 1207
5 6563 1163 6561 1162 6517 1153 6412 1132
6 7650 1088 7648 1087 7595 1078 7470 1057
7 8663 1013 8660 1012 8598 1003 8452 982
8 9600 938 9597 937 9527 928 9360 907
9 10463 863 10459 862 10380 853 10192 832
10 11250 788 11247 787 11159 778 10950 757
11 11963 713 11959 712 11862 703 11632 682
12 12600 638 12596 637 12490 628 12240 607
13 13163 563 13158 562 13044 553 12772 532
14 13650 488 13645 487 13522 478 13230 457
15 14063 413 14057 412 13925 403 13612 382
16 14400 338 14394 337 14254 328 13919 307
17 14663 263 14657 262 14507 253 14152 232
18 14850 188 14844 187 14685 178 14309 157
19 14963 113 14956 112 14789 103 14392 82
20 15000 38 14993 37 14817 28 14399 7
21 14963 -38 14955 -38 14770 -47 14332 -68
22 14850 -113 14842 -113 14649 -122 14189 -143
23 14663 -188 14655 -188 14452 -197 13972 -218
24 14400 -263 14392 -263 14181 -272 13679 -293
25 14063 -338 14054 -338 13834 -347 13312 -368
26 13650 -413 13641 -413 13412 -422 12869 -443
27 13163 -488 13153 -488 12916 -497 12352 -518
28 12600 -563 12590 -563 12344 -572 11759 -593
29 11963 -638 11953 -638 11697 -647 11092 -668
30 11250 -713 11240 -713 10976 -722 10349 -743
31 10463 -788 10452 -788 10179 -797 9531 -818
32 9600 -863 9589 -863 9307 -872 8639 -893
33 8663 -938 8651 -938 8361 -947 7671 -968
34 7650 -1013 7638 -1013 7339 -1022 6629 -1043
35 6563 -1088 6550 -1088 6242 -1097 5511 -1118
36 5400 -1163 5388 -1163 5071 -1172 4319 -1193
37 4163 -1238 4150 -1238 3824 -1247 3051 -1268
38 2850 -1313 2837 -1313 2503 -1322 1709 -1343
39 1463 -1388 1449 -1388 1106 -1397 291 -1418
40 0 -1463 -14 -1463 -366 -1472 -1201 -1493
41 -1538 -1538 -1552 -1538 -1912 -1547 -2769 -1568
42 -3150 -1613 -3164 -1613 -3534 -1622 -4411 -1643
43 -4838 -1688 -4852 -1688 -5231 -1697 -6129 -1718
44 -6600 -1763 -6615 -1763 -7002 -1772 -7921 -1793
45 -8438 -1838 -8453 -1838 -8849 -1847 -9789 -1868
Units MPG=4.91MPG=3.91MPG=2.91MPG=2.67
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ID: 3 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
MPG=4.99 MPG=5.99 MPG=6.99
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 853 853 852 852 842 842 822 822
2 1663 809 1661 808 1640 798 1600 778
3 2428 766 2425 765 2394 754 2334 734
4 3150 722 3146 721 3105 711 3025 691
5 3828 678 3823 677 3772 667 3671 647
6 4463 634 4457 633 4395 623 4275 603
7 5053 591 5046 590 4974 579 4834 559
8 5600 547 5592 546 5510 536 5349 516
9 6103 503 6095 502 6001 492 5821 472
10 6563 459 6553 458 6450 448 6249 428
11 6978 416 6968 415 6854 404 6634 384
12 7350 372 7339 371 7214 361 6974 341
13 7678 328 7666 327 7531 317 7271 297
14 7963 284 7949 283 7804 273 7524 253
15 8203 241 8189 240 8034 229 7733 209
16 8400 197 8385 196 8219 186 7899 166
17 8553 153 8537 152 8361 142 8021 122
18 8663 109 8645 108 8459 98 8099 78
19 8728 66 8710 65 8514 54 8133 34
20 8750 22 8731 21 8524 11 8123 -9
21 8728 -22 8708 -23 8491 -33 8070 -53
22 8663 -66 8642 -67 8414 -77 7973 -97
23 8553 -109 8531 -110 8293 -121 7833 -141
24 8400 -153 8377 -154 8129 -164 7648 -184
25 8203 -197 8179 -198 7921 -208 7420 -228
26 7963 -241 7938 -242 7669 -252 7148 -272
27 7678 -284 7653 -285 7373 -296 6832 -316
28 7350 -328 7323 -329 7034 -339 6473 -359
29 6978 -372 6951 -373 6651 -383 6070 -403
30 6563 -416 6534 -417 6224 -427 5623 -447
31 6103 -459 6074 -460 5753 -471 5132 -491
32 5600 -503 5570 -504 5239 -514 4597 -534
33 5053 -547 5022 -548 4680 -558 4019 -578
34 4463 -591 4430 -592 4078 -602 3397 -622
35 3828 -634 3795 -635 3433 -646 2732 -666
36 3150 -678 3116 -679 2743 -689 2022 -709
37 2428 -722 2393 -723 2010 -733 1269 -753
38 1663 -766 1626 -767 1233 -777 472 -797
39 853 -809 816 -810 413 -821 -369 -841
40 0 -853 -38 -854 -452 -864 -1253 -884
41 -897 -897 -936 -898 -1360 -908 -2181 -928
42 -1838 -941 -1877 -942 -2312 -952 -3153 -972
43 -2822 -984 -2863 -985 -3308 -996 -4169 -1016
44 -3850 -1028 -3892 -1029 -4347 -1039 -5228 -1059
45 -4922 -1072 -4965 -1073 -5430 -1083 -6332 -1103
MPG=4.57Units
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ID: 4 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 171 171 166 166 154 154 136 136
2 333 162 323 157 300 146 262 127
3 486 153 472 149 437 137 381 118
4 630 144 612 140 565 128 490 109
5 766 136 743 131 685 119 591 101
6 893 127 865 122 796 111 682 92
7 1011 118 979 114 898 102 766 83
8 1120 109 1084 105 991 93 840 74
9 1221 101 1180 96 1075 84 906 66
10 1313 92 1267 87 1151 76 962 57
11 1396 83 1346 79 1218 67 1011 48
12 1470 74 1416 70 1276 58 1050 39
13 1536 66 1477 61 1326 49 1081 31
14 1593 57 1529 52 1366 41 1102 22
15 1641 48 1573 44 1398 32 1116 13
16 1680 39 1608 35 1421 23 1120 4
17 1711 31 1634 26 1436 14 1116 -4
18 1733 22 1651 17 1442 6 1102 -13
19 1746 13 1660 9 1439 -3 1081 -22
20 1750 4 1660 0 1427 -12 1050 -31
21 1746 -4 1651 -9 1406 -21 1011 -39
22 1733 -13 1633 -18 1377 -29 962 -48
23 1711 -22 1607 -26 1339 -38 906 -57
24 1680 -31 1572 -35 1292 -47 840 -66
25 1641 -39 1528 -44 1237 -56 766 -74
26 1593 -48 1475 -53 1172 -64 682 -83
27 1536 -57 1414 -61 1099 -73 591 -92
28 1470 -66 1344 -70 1018 -82 490 -101
29 1396 -74 1265 -79 927 -91 381 -109
30 1313 -83 1177 -88 828 -99 262 -118
31 1221 -92 1081 -96 720 -108 136 -127
32 1120 -101 976 -105 603 -117 0 -136
33 1011 -109 862 -114 477 -126 -144 -144
34 893 -118 739 -123 343 -134 -298 -153
35 766 -127 608 -131 200 -143 -459 -162
36 630 -136 468 -140 48 -152 -630 -171
37 486 -144 319 -149 -112 -161 -809 -179
38 333 -153 161 -158 -282 -169 -998 -188
39 171 -162 -5 -166 -460 -178 -1194 -197
40 0 -171 -180 -175 -646 -187 -1400 -206
41 -179 -179 -364 -184 -842 -196 -1614 -214
42 -368 -188 -557 -193 -1046 -204 -1838 -223
43 -564 -197 -758 -201 -1259 -213 -2069 -232
44 -770 -206 -968 -210 -1481 -222 -2310 -241
45 -984 -214 -1187 -219 -1712 -231 -2559 -249
Units MPG=25.98MPG=22.86 MPG=23.98 MPG=24.98
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ID: 5 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 878 878 877 877 867 867 846 846
2 1710 833 1708 832 1688 822 1647 801
3 2498 788 2495 787 2465 777 2403 756
4 3240 743 3236 742 3197 732 3114 711
5 3938 698 3933 697 3884 687 3780 666
6 4590 653 4585 652 4525 642 4401 621
7 5198 608 5191 607 5122 597 4977 576
8 5760 563 5753 562 5674 552 5509 531
9 6278 518 6269 517 6181 507 5995 486
10 6750 473 6741 472 6642 462 6436 441
11 7178 428 7167 427 7059 417 6832 396
12 7560 383 7549 382 7431 372 7183 351
13 7898 338 7886 337 7758 327 7489 306
14 8190 293 8177 292 8039 282 7750 261
15 8438 248 8424 247 8276 237 7966 216
16 8640 203 8625 202 8468 192 8137 171
17 8798 158 8782 157 8615 147 8263 126
18 8910 113 8894 112 8716 102 8344 81
19 8978 68 8960 67 8773 57 8380 36
20 9000 23 8982 22 8785 12 8371 -9
21 8978 -23 8958 -23 8752 -33 8317 -54
22 8910 -68 8890 -68 8673 -78 8218 -99
23 8798 -113 8777 -113 8550 -123 8074 -144
24 8640 -158 8618 -158 8382 -168 7886 -189
25 8438 -203 8415 -203 8168 -213 7652 -234
26 8190 -248 8166 -248 7910 -258 7373 -279
27 7898 -293 7873 -293 7607 -303 7049 -324
28 7560 -338 7535 -338 7259 -348 6680 -369
29 7178 -383 7151 -383 6865 -393 6266 -414
30 6750 -428 6723 -428 6427 -438 5807 -459
31 6278 -473 6249 -473 5944 -483 5303 -504
32 5760 -518 5731 -518 5416 -528 4754 -549
33 5198 -563 5167 -563 4842 -573 4160 -594
34 4590 -608 4559 -608 4224 -618 3521 -639
35 3938 -653 3906 -653 3561 -663 2837 -684
36 3240 -698 3207 -698 2853 -708 2108 -729
37 2498 -743 2464 -743 2099 -753 1334 -774
38 1710 -788 1675 -788 1301 -798 515 -819
39 878 -833 842 -833 458 -843 -349 -864
40 0 -878 -36 -878 -430 -888 -1257 -909
41 -923 -923 -960 -923 -1364 -933 -2211 -954
42 -1890 -968 -1928 -968 -2342 -978 -3210 -999
43 -2903 -1013 -2942 -1013 -3365 -1023 -4254 -1044
44 -3960 -1058 -4000 -1058 -4433 -1068 -5343 -1089
45 -5063 -1103 -5103 -1103 -5547 -1113 -6477 -1134
Units MPG = 6.85MPG=5.85MPG=4.85MPG=4.44
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ID: 6 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 951 951 950 950 940 940 920 920
2 1853 902 1851 901 1832 891 1790 871
3 2706 853 2703 852 2674 843 2613 822
4 3510 804 3507 804 3468 794 3386 773
5 4266 756 4262 755 4213 745 4111 725
6 4973 707 4968 706 4910 696 4786 676
7 5631 658 5625 657 5557 648 5414 627
8 6240 609 6234 609 6156 599 5992 578
9 6801 561 6794 560 6706 550 6521 530
10 7313 512 7305 511 7208 501 7002 481
11 7776 463 7767 462 7660 453 7434 432
12 8190 414 8181 414 8064 404 7818 383
13 8556 366 8546 365 8420 355 8152 335
14 8873 317 8862 316 8726 306 8438 286
15 9141 268 9129 267 8984 258 8675 237
16 9360 219 9348 219 9192 209 8864 188
17 9531 171 9518 170 9353 160 9003 140
18 9653 122 9639 121 9464 111 9094 91
19 9726 73 9711 72 9527 63 9136 42
20 9750 24 9735 24 9541 14 9130 -7
21 9726 -24 9710 -25 9506 -35 9074 -55
22 9653 -73 9636 -74 9422 -84 8970 -104
23 9531 -122 9513 -123 9290 -132 8817 -153
24 9360 -171 9342 -171 9109 -181 8616 -202
25 9141 -219 9122 -220 8879 -230 8365 -250
26 8873 -268 8853 -269 8600 -279 8066 -299
27 8556 -317 8535 -318 8273 -327 7718 -348
28 8190 -366 8169 -366 7897 -376 7322 -397
29 7776 -414 7754 -415 7472 -425 6876 -445
30 7313 -463 7290 -464 6998 -474 6382 -494
31 6801 -512 6777 -513 6476 -522 5839 -543
32 6240 -561 6216 -561 5905 -571 5247 -592
33 5631 -609 5606 -610 5285 -620 4607 -640
34 4973 -658 4947 -659 4617 -669 3918 -689
35 4266 -707 4239 -708 3899 -717 3180 -738
36 3510 -756 3483 -756 3133 -766 2393 -787
37 2706 -804 2678 -805 2318 -815 1558 -835
38 1853 -853 1824 -854 1455 -864 674 -884
39 951 -902 921 -903 542 -912 -259 -933
40 0 -951 -30 -951 -419 -961 -1241 -982
41 -999 -999 -1030 -1000 -1429 -1010 -2271 -1030
42 -2048 -1048 -2079 -1049 -2487 -1059 -3350 -1079
43 -3144 -1097 -3177 -1098 -3595 -1107 -4478 -1128
44 -4290 -1146 -4323 -1146 -4751 -1156 -5655 -1177
45 -5484 -1194 -5518 -1195 -5956 -1205 -6880 -1225
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
MPG=6.47MPG=5.47MPG=4.10 MPG=4.47Units
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ID: 8  
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 926 948 925 925 916 916 895 895
2 1805 879 1803 878 1784 868 1743 848
3 2636 831 2634 830 2605 821 2543 800
4 3420 784 3417 783 3378 773 3296 753
5 4156 736 4152 735 4104 726 4001 705
6 4845 689 4840 688 4782 678 4659 658
7 5486 641 5481 640 5413 631 5269 610
8 6080 594 6074 593 5996 583 5831 563
9 6626 546 6619 545 6532 536 6347 515
10 7125 499 7117 498 7021 488 6814 468
11 7576 451 7568 450 7461 441 7235 420
12 7980 404 7970 403 7855 393 7607 373
13 8336 356 8326 355 8200 346 7932 325
14 8645 309 8634 308 8499 298 8210 278
15 8906 261 8894 260 8750 251 8440 230
16 9120 214 9107 213 8953 203 8623 183
17 9286 166 9273 165 9109 156 8758 135
18 9405 119 9391 118 9217 108 8846 88
19 9476 71 9461 70 9278 61 8886 40
20 9500 24 9484 23 9291 13 8879 -7
21 9476 -24 9460 -25 9257 -34 8824 -55
22 9405 -71 9388 -72 9175 -82 8722 -102
23 9286 -119 9268 -120 9046 -129 8572 -150
24 9120 -166 9101 -167 8869 -177 8374 -197
25 8906 -214 8886 -215 8645 -224 8130 -245
26 8645 -261 8624 -262 8373 -272 7837 -292
27 8336 -309 8315 -310 8054 -319 7497 -340
28 7980 -356 7958 -357 7688 -367 7110 -387
29 7576 -404 7553 -405 7273 -414 6675 -435
30 7125 -451 7101 -452 6812 -462 6193 -482
31 6626 -499 6602 -500 6302 -509 5663 -530
32 6080 -546 6055 -547 5746 -557 5086 -577
33 5486 -594 5460 -595 5142 -604 4461 -625
34 4845 -641 4818 -642 4490 -652 3789 -672
35 4156 -689 4129 -690 3791 -699 3069 -720
36 3420 -736 3391 -737 3044 -747 2302 -767
37 2636 -784 2607 -785 2250 -794 1487 -815
38 1805 -831 1775 -832 1408 -842 625 -862
39 926 -879 895 -880 519 -889 -285 -910
40 0 -926 -32 -927 -418 -937 -1243 -957
41 -974 -974 -1006 -975 -1402 -984 -2247 -1005
42 -1995 -1021 -2028 -1022 -2434 -1032 -3300 -1052
43 -3064 -1069 -3098 -1070 -3513 -1079 -4400 -1100
44 -4180 -1116 -4215 -1117 -4640 -1127 -5547 -1147
45 -5344 -1164 -5379 -1165 -5814 -1174 -6742 -1195
Units MPG=4.21 MPG=6.59MPG=5.59MPG=4.59
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ID: 10 
Total Value and Unit (marginal) Value of Different Vehicles 
TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT TOTAL UNIT
1 195 195 191 191 179 179 160 160
2 380 185 372 181 349 169 311 150
3 555 175 544 171 508 159 451 140
4 720 165 705 161 658 149 582 130
5 875 155 856 151 797 139 702 120
6 1020 145 997 141 927 129 813 110
7 1155 135 1129 131 1046 119 913 100
8 1280 125 1250 121 1156 109 1003 90
9 1395 115 1361 111 1255 99 1084 80
10 1500 105 1462 101 1344 89 1154 70
11 1595 95 1554 91 1424 79 1215 60
12 1680 85 1635 81 1493 69 1265 50
13 1755 75 1706 71 1553 59 1306 40
14 1820 65 1767 61 1602 49 1336 30
15 1875 55 1819 51 1642 39 1357 20
16 1920 45 1860 41 1671 29 1367 10
17 1955 35 1891 31 1691 19 1367 0
18 1980 25 1912 21 1700 9 1358 -10
19 1995 15 1924 11 1699 -1 1338 -20
20 2000 5 1925 1 1689 -11 1309 -30
21 1995 -5 1916 -9 1668 -21 1269 -40
22 1980 -15 1897 -19 1638 -31 1220 -50
23 1955 -25 1868 -29 1597 -41 1160 -60
24 1920 -35 1830 -39 1547 -51 1090 -70
25 1875 -45 1781 -49 1486 -61 1011 -80
26 1820 -55 1722 -59 1416 -71 921 -90
27 1755 -65 1653 -69 1335 -81 822 -100
28 1680 -75 1575 -79 1244 -91 712 -110
29 1595 -85 1486 -89 1144 -101 593 -120
30 1500 -95 1387 -99 1033 -111 463 -130
31 1395 -105 1278 -109 913 -121 323 -140
32 1280 -115 1160 -119 782 -131 174 -150
33 1155 -125 1031 -129 642 -141 14 -160
34 1020 -135 892 -139 491 -151 -155 -170
35 875 -145 743 -149 331 -161 -335 -180
36 720 -155 585 -159 160 -171 -524 -190
37 555 -165 416 -169 -20 -181 -724 -200
38 380 -175 237 -179 -211 -191 -933 -210
39 195 -185 48 -189 -412 -201 -1153 -220
40 0 -195 -150 -199 -622 -211 -1383 -230
41 -205 -205 -359 -209 -843 -221 -1622 -240
42 -420 -215 -578 -219 -1073 -231 -1872 -250
43 -645 -225 -807 -229 -1314 -241 -2131 -260
44 -880 -235 -1046 -239 -1564 -251 -2401 -270
45 -1125 -245 -1294 -249 -1825 -261 -2680 -280
Units MPG=23.05MPG=20 MPG=21.05 MPG=22.05
 
 
9  
References 
Bartlett, M. S. (1937). “Properties of sufficiency and statistical tests.” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London, Series A, 160, 268–282.  
Conover, William J., Mark E. Johnson, and Myrle M. Johnson (1981). “A comparative study of 
tests for homogeneity of variances, with applications to the outer continental shelf bidding data.” 
Technometrics, 23, 351–361.  
Crandall, R.W. 1985. “Why Should We Regulate Fuel Economy at All?” Brookings Review, 
3(3), 3-7. 
Crandall, R.W. 1990. “The Changing Rationale for Motor Vehicle Fuel-Economy Regulation”. 
Regulation, 13(3), 10-13. 
Ellerman, A.D., H.D. Jacoby, D. Henry and M.B. Zimmerman, Martin B. 2006. “Bringing 
Transportation into a CO2 Cap-and-Trade Regime”. Mimeo. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi K. 1998. “The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in 
the US”. Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(1), 1-33. 
Greene, D.L. 1990. “CAFE or Price? An Analysis of the Effects of Federal Fuel Economy 
Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89”. Energy Journal, 11(3), 37-57. 
Hirota, Masayoshi, Ming Hsu, Charles R. Plott and Brian W. Rogers. 2005. Divergence, Closes 
Cycles and Convergence in Scarf Environments: Experiments in the Dynamics of General 
Equilibrium Systems. Social Science Working Paper 1239, California Institute of Technology. 
Hogg, Robert V., Joseph W McKean and Allen T. Craig. 2005. Introduction to Mathematical 
Statistics (6th ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Hollander, Myles, and Douglas A. Wolfe. 1999. Nonparametric Statistical Methods (2nd ed.), 
New York: Wiley-Interscience, 
Mayo, J. and J. Mathis. 1988. “The Effectiveness of Mandatory Fuel Efficiency Standards in 
Reducing the Demand for Gasoline”. Applied Economics, 20(2), 211-19. 
McKenzie, Lionel W., 2002. Classical General Equilibrium Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mukherji, Anjan, 2002. An Introduction to General Equilibrium Analysis. Oxford University 
Press. 
Mukherji, Anjan, 2003. “Competitive Equilibria: Convergence, Cycles or Chaos”. Centre for 
Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 
Plott, C. R. and V. Smith. 1978. “An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions”. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 45(1), 133-53. 
